Committee ("IWOC"), part of the Industrial Workers of the World labor union, organized the strike through mailings and conference calls to inmates and their families and through partnerships with lawyers and activists. 7 Through the strike, the inmates and organizers aimed to call attention to a range of grievances, including unfair pay for inmate work and inhumane prison conditions. 8 Casting light on and adding gravity to these issues is the IWOC's rallying call for the strike: "This is a Call to Action Against Slavery in America." 9 The IWOC is one of many voices in the growing discussion of prison labor as a form of modern-day slavery in the United States.
10
Inmate labor at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, also known as Angola, provides a stark example of what gives rise to these discussions. Located on what was once a slave plantation, Angola is now home to a program under which inmates work in the same plantation fields for as little as two cents per hour. 11 The prison can force the inmates to work after they are cleared by a doctor, and it is not required to compensate them. 12 Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment authorizes this program when it provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 7 Kim, supra note 3. 8 See Schwartzapfel, supra note 6. This Note seeks to demonstrate that labor law can provide one avenue for remedying some of the grievances of incarcerated workers. 15 In particular, this Note argues that the National Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB" or "the Board") August 2016 decision regarding the right of graduate research assistants to unionize in Columbia University creates a particularly relevant opening for arguing that incarcerated workers are also able to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act"). Part I of this Note provides background information on the prison system in the United States and the ways in which inmate labor occurs within it, as well as on the NLRA and the NLRB. Part II lays the groundwork for the application of Columbia University to the situation of incarcerated workers by providing an overview of decisions regarding the status of incarcerated workers under labor and employment statutes before Columbia University and of the Board's decision in Columbia University. Part III contrasts the Board's reasoning in Columbia University with these earlier decisions and argues that the Board has set itself up to disagree with their reasoning and in fact has interpreted the Act such that incarcerated workers should be protected under it. Part III also raises and addresses a number of potential obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization and contends that none of these obstacles must necessarily prevent their unionization. Though Part III also reveals that the 13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; id. 14 (2016) . 15 The proposals in this Note are proposals for changes that will occur within the United States' existing incarceration system. However, they could also operate as part of movements that call for the abolition of this system itself. See ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 103-04 (2003) .
number of incarcerated workers who would currently fall under the Act's protection is somewhat limited, this Note argues that in light of the ways in which prison labor is a form of modern-day slavery, the Board, courts, and the public should seize this opportunity to establish a foundation for incarcerated worker unionization.
16

I. Background
A. The U.S. Prison System
The structure of the prison system in the United States, and how inmate labor occurs within it, will affect the application of the NLRB's decision in Columbia University to incarcerated worker unionization, as discussed in greater detail in Part III. Under a "contract" system, a private firm, rather than the government, operates the work program pursuant to a contract with the prison. 46 Workers in this type of system remain in the prison's custody while they work. 47 Work release programs, in which inmates are permitted to work for pay in the community during the day, 48 also fall under the umbrella of contract systems. Act and its exceptions, UNICOR sell its products only to the federal government, 65 and state prison industry programs sell only to state and local governments. 66 Congress created an additional exception to the Ashurst-Sumners Act when it created the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program ("PIE") in 1979. 67 The program exempts certified state and local departments of corrections from the Ashurst-Sumners Act's restrictions, permitting them to sell goods produced by incarcerated workers in the open market. 68 To become certified under the program, the state or local department of corrections must demonstrate that it meets the requirements set out in the Mandatory Criteria for Program
Participation. 69 As of September 30, 2016, 47 jurisdictions were PIE-certified, and a total of 5,435 inmates worked in programs in these jurisdictions. 70 These programs involve partnerships with private corporations, and these corporations either serve as customers of the departments of correction or as direct employers of incarcerated workers. 71 PIE-certified programs must pay wages "at a rate not less than that paid for work of a similar nature in the locality in which the work is performed." 72 However, corrections departments are free to take deductions from the wages of incarcerated workers for taxes, room and board, family support, and victims' compensation, and these deductions can total up to 80% of a worker's gross wages. 73 For the quarter ending September 30, 2016, PIE-certified programs resulted in gross wages of $11,104,906, but after deductions, net wages to incarcerated workers were only $4,780,857. The NLRA also establishes the National Labor Relations Board, which consists of five members that are appointed by the President for five-year terms. 79 The Board primarily acts as a quasi-judicial body, 80 deciding cases regarding unfair labor practices under the Act. 81 However, the Board also oversees the union election process, which occurs when employees submit a petition to the Board to certify or decertify a union as their bargaining representative.
82
Additionally, the Board fills gaps in the NLRA by engaging in rulemaking or by announcing policies and rules in the matters it adjudicates. 83 The Board relies almost exclusively on adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to establish rules and policies. 84 Notably, the doctrine of stare decisis, which refers to courts' practice of adhering to a previous decision when that 77 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . ." (emphasis added)). The statute defines "employee" as "any employee . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act . 96 See id.at 884-896. 97 Compare id. at n.101-02 (collecting over forty-five cases in which courts found no employment relationship), with id. at n.103 (collecting seven cases in which courts found that there could be an employment relationship at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage). 98 See id. at 882.
for which they work are in nonmarket or noneconomic relationships, and thus they are not employees and employers in an employment relationship.
99
Many of these courts find that the relationship between incarcerated workers and the institutions for which they work is nonmarket or noneconomic by conflating economic relationships with contract relationships. 100 As Zatz explains, this type of reasoning has three components-there is no free contract when prison labor is involuntary, there is no contract when there is no exchange between the parties, and whatever exchange exists between the parties fails to take the form of a discrete bargain. 101 The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Morgan v.
MacDonald illustrates the first two of these components. There, the court states:
Under The fundamental error of the Brown University Board was to frame the issue of statutory coverage not in terms of the existence of an employment relationship, but rather on whether some other relationship between the employee and the employer is the primary one-a standard neither derived from the statutory text of Section 2(3) nor from the fundamental policy of the Act.
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According to this decision, as long as there is an employment relationship, the existence of some other relationship not covered by the Act does not prevent an individual from being protected as an employee. 109 Further, the Columbia University Board notes:
The Board and the courts have repeatedly made clear that the extent of any required "economic" dimension to an employment relationship is the payment of tangible compensation. Even when such an economic component may seem comparatively slight, relative to other aspects of the relationship between worker and employer, the payment of compensation, in conjunction with the employer's control, suffices to establish an employment relationship for purposes of the Act.
110
The Board then explains that multiple relationships between employers and employees can coexist because the Act permits the Board to define the scope of the mandatory bargaining over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment that will occur between employers and employees. Board declining to exercise its jurisdiction over a case, and it shows that the Board's reasons for declining to exercise its jurisdiction are not applicable to the situation of incarcerated workers.
In Northwestern University, the Board explains that asserting jurisdiction over a representation petition and determining whether Northwestern University football players who receive grant-in-aid scholarships are employees under the NLRA would not effectuate the policy underlying the Act. 123 The Board emphasizes that this decision not to assert jurisdiction is based on its findings regarding the nature of sports leagues. 124 Because of the control that leagues exercise over the individual teams within them and the fact that the "overwhelming majority" of teams in the leagues are public schools, over which the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction, the This is not the case in the context of incarcerated worker labor, however. The products of incarcerated worker labor exist without direct interaction between workers in one prison and workers in another and without direct interaction between public and private prison systems as a whole. Though it is true that many inmates work in public prisons over which the Board cannot exercise jurisdiction, the lack of direct interaction between these incarcerated workers and those in private prisons means that Board decisions regarding workers in private institutions will not create instability in the system as a whole. Further, as illustrated by the Board's exercise of jurisdiction in Columbia University, the fact that a type of labor exists in both a public and a private setting, as does graduate teaching assistant labor, cannot be the sole reason that the Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction. Given the coordinated and widespread strikes described in the introduction to this Note, it is also clear that the policies of the Act-alleviating industrial strife and unequal bargaining power between employers and employees-would be furthered if the Board exercised jurisdiction over incarcerated workers. Though these distinctions between
Northwestern University and the situation of incarcerated workers do not ensure that the Board Northwestern Football Case for "Stability," ON LABOR (Aug. 20, 2015), https://onlabor.org/2015/08/20/guest-post-n-l-r-b-missed-shot-by-declining-jurisdiction-innorthwestern-football-case-for-stability/. 126 See id. 127 Id.
will exercise jurisdiction in a case involving these workers, they do show that the issue of exercising jurisdiction should not necessarily prevent incarcerated worker unionization.
C. Employers in the Prison System
A Board finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA would not grant protection to all prison labor organizations because not all incarcerated workers have employers that are covered by the Act. Some employers of incarcerated workers are not covered by the Act because it excludes federal and state governments from the employer category. As described in Part I, many incarcerated workers contribute to day-to-day prison operations in public institutions or work for government-owned corporations like UNICOR, over which the Board has no jurisdiction. 128 Other employers are likely not covered by the Act because they do not meet the interstate commerce requirements for the Board's statutory jurisdiction. This is likely the case for the employment relationship between private institutions and incarcerated workers contributing to prison operations for them. However, approximately 130,000 inmates currently live in federal and state private prisons, and though the structures of the labor systems under which they work are not clear, some of these inmates manufacture goods for the private prison or local employers. 129 A Board finding that these incarcerated workers are employees under, and thus protected by, the NLRA would move these workers one step further from the forms of modern-day slavery under which they currently work. The same could also be true for 128 For an argument that government-owned prison industry corporations should not be excluded from NLRA coverage because they are proprietary enterprises indistinguishable from their private-sector counterparts, see Fink, supra note 14, at 967 n.102. 129 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
E. Incarcerated Worker Labor Unions in Practice
Obstacles to incarcerated worker unionization will exist even if the Board exercises its jurisdiction to find that these workers are employees under the Act and a court finds that the Act preempts any conflicting state statutes. Incarcerated worker unions will also face legal and practical obstacles as they begin to form and operate. The union notified the superintendent of Green Haven that it wanted to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the inmates and requested a meeting for negotiations on wages, hours, and working conditions. 150 The Ohio Prisoners' Labor Union also formed in 1971 and set as its goals minimum-wage salaries and workmen's compensation for incarcerated workers, correcting dangerous working conditions, and encouraging private industry to come into the institutions, among other things. 151 Though the Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Jones undercut the growing prisoners' union movement in the United States, 152 incarcerated worker unions currently operate in other countries. In Argentina, the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores
Privados de la Libertad Ambulatoria ("SUTPLA"), a union formed in 2012 of people incarcerated in a Buenos Aires prison, has 800 members and is recognized under an agreement with the Federal Penitentiary Service. 153 Leaders of the Argentinean trade union federation to which SUTPLA belongs say that the International Labor Organization is closely watching SUTPLA because it may serve as an example for other countries to follow. 154 In addition to examples from past and present incarcerated worker unions, visions for the widespread operation of these unions in the United States also come from scholars. In her article on the feasibility of incarcerated worker labor unions, Susan Blankenship suggests that these unions' constitutions could provide for elected leaders who frequently rotate out of their positions in order to provide ample leadership opportunities for those who want them and to reduce the potential for envy or resentment of inmates in these positions. 155 Blankenship also envisions a non-adversarial, interest-based collective bargaining context in which the parties would come to the bargaining table with proposals for reaching their shared goals. 156 Scholars also acknowledge that the unique context of incarceration may call for some limitations on the unions that form within it. In his analysis of proposals for incarcerated worker labor unions, Paul R. Comeau notes that as in the case of public employees, incarcerated workers might be denied the right to strike, an outcome that institutions could justify with considerations of safety and order both within and outside the institution. 157 Comeau also suggests that institutions could limit the size of the audience to a union gathering or the location or time of such a gathering. 158 Further, though incarcerated worker unions could call attention to and seek to address prison conditions generally, the NLRA would only require employers to bargain with unions over wages, hours, and working conditions.
In addition to envisioning how incarcerated worker unions could operate, scholars, as well as courts, 159 have acknowledged the potential benefits of these unions. In an article on the causes of and ways to avoid prison riots, Vernon Fox argues that "[s]ome type of inmate selfgovernment that involves honest and well supervised elections of inmate representatives to discuss problems, make recommendations, and perhaps, even take some responsibilities from the administration could be helpful." 160 In an article on the need for restructuring of the prison economic system, Sarah M. Singleton notes that incarcerated workers receiving equitable payment for work performed could be able to provide support for their family, continue payments on social security, provide restitution if applicable to their case, and save money to assist themselves upon their release from prison. 161 Similarly, Comeau notes that incarcerated worker unions that offer power to inmates and that are designed to eliminate abuses in prisons could be useful tools for the "genuine rehabilitation" of incarcerated individuals. 162 Indeed,
Comeau argues:
In the general labor force, employer acceptance of and cooperation with labor organization has resulted in a reduction of union militancy and the stabilization of industrial relations. If the formation of unions within correctional facilities would have this effect, it is possible that administrators would have legal and social responsibility to allow unionization. 163 
Conclusion
In an article on the intersection between law and prisons, Jonathan A. Willens writes:
The decision in Jones . . . presented the substance of imprisonment, what the prison will be, and the Court refused to look. . . .
[E]ven while refusing to look at the substance of imprisonment, the Court legitimates a particular substance by imposing and enforcing its legal structure. Because this legal structure rests on a particular conception of what prison is, the law creates a prison that increasingly reflects this conception.
164
In this way, courts and the law build prisons. In this way too, the Board, courts, and the public currently have an opportunity to reshape the prisons that they have built. The Board's decision in Columbia University creates an opening for finding that incarcerated workers are employees under the NLRA and are thus able to form unions protected by the Act. Though a number of obstacles will likely arise on the path to incarcerated worker unionization, this Note offers solutions to these obstacles and argues that given the ways in which prison labor is a form of modern-day slavery, the Board and courts should take up these solutions.
